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‘TO THE LAW MACHINE’ REVISITED:
A SURVEY & ANALYSIS OF METHODS
AND TECHNIQUES FOR AUTOMATION
IN THE LEGAL WORLD
—Avinash Ambale*

Abstract Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Law has a long his-

tory of research dating back to at least 1958. Despite decades
of work, Artificial Intelligence has not scaled out of academia
to real-life courtrooms and mediation chambers. The reason,
in our opinion is: theory of learning in computation has only
recently caught up with adversarial inference or defeasible logic,
a form of social learning widely used both in theory and practice of common law. We posit that Artificial Intelligence that uses
Causal Inference models (a quantum leap from defeasible logic)
approximate social learning very well. They provide a quantitative formulation for assignation of legal liability. We opine that
mathematical formulations of non-zero-sum Game Theory could
provide alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms for
Consumer Law. The central theme of this paper is an analysis
of the theory (logic & mathematics) of learning, i.e., epistemology in computation and jurisprudence, individually and at their
intersection. In our analysis, we find mathematical models are
finally approximating real-life dispute resolution. However, these
require legal documents to be in standardized, formal language.
The models cannot comprehend the wide variety, style and format of legal documents. We prescribe standardized document
interchange and markup formats. Without these standardized
inputs, Artificial Intelligence cannot automate negotiations & the
decision process. It will fail to meet expected outcomes – provision of voluminous, consistent & speedy ‘access to justice’ in
Consumer Law ODR.

*

CEO/Founder Pervazive Inc., a research lab focussed on Artificial Intelligence &
Computational Neuroscience. He can be contacted at avi.ambale@pervazive.com.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Let us imagine a lawyer’s chambers. To further indulge our imagination,
the lawyer is behind an invisible pane of glass, both unseen and unheard.
The only mode of interaction with the lawyer is by text. Below the pane
of glass, there is an envelope sized slot, similar to ones at box office counters. You slide a note with questions in text format into the slot and retrieve
textual legal opinions from this slot. Futuristic? Hardly – this consultation
machine was extensively researched, symbolic logic derived & representational Boolean binary code for computing created in 1958. What is significant about 1958?
II. STRUCTURE

The answer to that question is the first section on the History of AI &
Law in our literature review in this paper. The second section will describe
computing epistemology for social learning similar to the adversarial system
in the law. In the third section of this paper, we will look Causal Inference
models and Game Theory models for Online Dispute Resolution. In the
fourth section of this paper, we will look at possible reasons why AI has not
scaled into real-life mediation chambers and court-rooms. In the concluding
section, we will look at possible ways forward.
III. ASSUMPTION, DEFINITIONS &
INTERPRETATION OF TERMS

1. The sleight-of-hand of the invisible lawyer serves the author’s purpose of a Turing Test1 for law.
2. The systematic logic or mathematical models for theory of learning, i.e., epistemology of legal thought can be executed on computing machines. Hence, we argue that all AI we illustrate in this paper,
except one in an adjudicative setting is applicable to Online Dispute
Resolution (ODR). To the argument that Online represents the internet as we commonly know it; we present the semantic argument that
AI is computed on inter-connected networks – public or private, of
computers and is symbolically represented in a connectionist model.

1

Wikipedia Contributors, “Turing Test”, (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 2 September
2019,
18:57
UTC),
<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Turing_test&oldid=
913708188> accessed September 12, 2019.
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The only technical difference is the presentation layer: one, the pane
of glass that could be a computer screen and two, the input/output
slot for textual messages that could be electronic or written text.
Hence, the AI i.e., systematic logic we discuss in this paper can be
read as applicable to Online Dispute Resolution with only the presentation layer as a perceptual difference between what we commonly
think of as Online and Offline.
3. We submit that we have liberally interpreted the terms law and legal
to mean both the adjudicative law process and Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR) process throughout the text.
4. In our definition, any set of human thought or decision-making
processes that can be represented by mathematical constructs and
symbols - with or without their embodiment in computer language
- represents an Artificially Intelligent system. Our additional requirement for an AI System is one that continuously & automatically
updates itself from available data; rather than being a static, rulebased system that does not update its mathematical model. Due to
this requirement, we will exclude rule-based ODR systems like eBay
Resolution Center & Modria ODR from this analysis.
Due to the common & popular conflation of the terms Artificial
Intelligence and Deep Learning; throughout this text, when we refer
to AI in general, we mean only the Deep Learning or Artificial
Neural Network sub-field; not Machine Learning or other sub-fields.
While we might seek to pit zero-sum game Neural Networks against
non-zero-sum game formulations; both hew to our definition of an
AI, in that they are based on underlying mathematical constructs.
AI and (&) Law is to be read as AI applied to Law to distinguish it
from AI in general.
5. “To the Law Machine” was presented at the First Symposium on
Mechanization of Thought Processes which explains the title of our
paper “To the Law Machine” Revisited.
6. In the context of this paper, it is important to draw a distinction in
terminology. Automation is implied to mean a continuously running
mechanized process without human intervention. Mechanization is
implied to mean automation of an individual or discrete set of independent tasks or thoughts. Machine Intelligence (or machines) and
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Artificial Intelligence are used inter-changeably to refer to computerized mechanization of human thought and decisions. Algorithms are
implied to mean mathematical models that can be precisely expressed
in formalized computer languages.
7. In the context of this paper, we use the term ‘balance of probabilities’ in a statistical, Bayesian manner; not necessarily and always in
the ‘civil dispute legal standard’ manner.
IV. SECTION 1: HISTORY OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND LAW

What is significant about 1958? It follows 1956 by a mere two years &
the significance of 1956 is that it is the official birth year of the field and
term ‘Artificial Intelligence’2. Following the birth of this new field of study,
Artificial Intelligence (AI); its founding fathers John McCarthy and Marvin
Minsky led the symposium on “the Mechanization of Thought Processes”3
to collate, curate and present the work of a wide variety of scientists
from various disciplines working towards a Mechanistic view of Thought
Processes.
In 1958, at the very first symposium on “Mechanization of Thought
Processes”, Dr. Lucien Mehl, a Maitre Des Requets to the Council of State,
France presented his paper on “Automation in the Legal World”4. This was
a logical framework with associated symbolic language to create both an
Information Machine and a Consultation Machine. To Dr. Mehl, the goal of
the Information Machine was to achieve a speedy, accurate & reliable information retrieval mechanism to free up time for proper legal research and
logical thought. His motivation to create an Information Machine was the
ever growing (at an alarming scale in his own words) scale of the number of
laws and regulations & scope of jurisprudence. The goal of the Consultation
Machine was to bring to legal science, the mathematical tools to create a

2

3

4

Kaplan A. and Haenlein M., “Siri, Siri, in My Hand: Who’s the Fairest in the Land?
On the Interpretations, Illustrations, and Implications of Artificial Intelligence” (2019)
Business Horizons, 62(1), 15, 25.
Mechanisation of Thought Processes: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at the National
Physical Laboratory on 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th November 1958 (National Physical
Laboratory).
Mehl, L., “Automation in the Legal World: From the Machine Processing of Legal
Information to the ‘Law Machine’ ”, Mechanisation of Thought Processes: Proceedings
of a Symposium Held at the National Physical Laboratory on 24th, 25th, 26th and 27th
November 1958 (1959, Vol. II, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London) pp. 755–787.
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systematic logical argument for legal problems whose solutions could unambiguously be drawn from available data.
In the introductory notes to his seminal work, Dr. Mehl describes a problem with the multiplicity of legal sources, a problem that persists to date.
As an example, the governing laws and jurisdictions might be provincial,
federal or global. The laws might be manifested as governing edicts laid by
legislating bodies or as treatises and reviews by judicial authors; across a
wide variety of documents such as contracts, treaties, laws and decrees. We
will look at these issues in Section 4 of this paper on the challenges of AI &
Law.
Dr. Mehl recommended a codification of texts from divergent sources of
law – legislature, statutes or jurisprudence - into a common, harmonized
standard prior to automation. Following Max Weber’s theory of rationalization as a precursor to mastery by calculation5, specifically interpreting it as
machine driven calculation; we infer that rationalization through codification of sources of law is an essential step preceding mechanization of legal
thought. Like Dr. Mehl, we will not describe how to codify the divergent
sources of law in this section. Unlike Dr. Mehl, we will look at a few efforts
at codifying legal knowledge in Section 4 of this paper.
Dr. Mehl’s basic premise and underlying epistemological inference is that
the body of law can be reduced to a few basic or elementary concepts. Or,
to construct his argument differently, a limited set of elementary concepts
expands into the wide body of legal knowledge. Dr. Mehl’s breakthrough
was ground-breaking. He modelled elementary legal concepts as moving
in an arithmetic progression. Simultaneously, he modeled data, notions, situations and problems evolving from these basic concepts as increasing in
a dual exponential fashion. This unified model laid the systematic logical
basis for expressing legal language in a Boolean binary framework. Using
Boolean operators to construct dual exponential functions and deconstruct
to arithmetic progression made possible the translation of legal language
into computerized codification; thereby laying the foundations for mechanization and automation of Law.
Dr. Mehl showed that in cases of trade law - with just 6 basic concepts, there are 64 logical combinations and 16 quintillion (10 followed by
5

Sung Ho Kim, Max Weber’s Politics of Civil Society, [The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition)] <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/
weber/> [accessed 12 September 2019].
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18 zeros) logical functions. Calculating 16 quintillion logical functions for
Dr. Mehl’s illustrated case of tax computation of goods sold by a trader
was impossible for the computing power available in the late 50s. It follows
naturally that the technical implementation of this AI in trade dispute settlement was not feasible. Nonetheless, the ability to deconstruct and reconstruct legal language into Boolean operators is an extremely strong legacy to
build AIs for Law.
Shifting forward in time, let us look at the work of another leading figure in AI & Law, L Thorne McCarty and his TAXMAN AI6. L Thorne
McCarty took his work forward from Dr. Mehl’s “elementary concept” logic
foundation. McCarty created computer representations of legal concepts in a
very narrow area of US Corporate Tax Law – the re-organization of corporations. McCarty used abstract symbolic representations to model legal concepts due to the ability of these abstractions to be linked to computational
structures. McCarty used corporate tax law as the area of law for implementation of computer models as, in his view, it has many layers of commercial abstraction that are “artificial and formal systems themselves, drained
of much of the content of the ordinary world”, and because, by legal standards, it is very technical.7 McCarty’s TAXMAN8 is one of the first computer
embodiments of the systematic logical models for legal reasoning.
His choice, in 1972 of a narrow area of law that is an abstraction and
hence lending itself to be modelled easily in computer language analogy seems prescient even in 2019. Current state-of-art of AI through Deep
Learning is ANI (Artificial Narrow Intelligence), i.e., it has the ability to
out-perform human intelligence in narrow tasks like image classification.
From that perspective, selecting a narrow and deep area of focus in the law
seems to serve the cause of AI & Law better than a broad, Grand Unified
Theory for codification of all law and justice. Seeking a Grand Unified
Theory to codify and automate all areas of law is like seeking Artificial
General Intelligence (AGI).

6

7

8

L. Thorne McCarty, “Reflections on TAXMAN: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence
and Legal Reasoning”, (1977) Harvard Law Review, Vol. 90, March 1977, No. 5.
L.T. McCarty, “Some Requirements for a Computer-Based Legal Consultant”, Technical
Report LRP-TR-8, Laboratory for Computer Science Research, New Jersey: Rutgers
University.
The TAXMAN program was written in 1972–73 and first discussed in a paper presented
at the Workshop on Computer Applications to Legal Research and Analysis, Stanford Law
School, April 28–29, 1972.
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McCarty’s observation that “simplest legal problems of first-year law students are the hardest for AI because they require ordinary human experience, which is so alien to AI, but inherent to students.”9 seems prophetic.
Artificial Intelligence (Deep Learning) has not progressed to the stage
where it can replicate human learning and experience. Differences between
Deep Learning and human learning include the inability of the former
to learn causal models of the world from very little data leveraging prior
knowledge10 (a theme we will progressively detail before going to causal
models in Section 3).
We are chronicling the history of thought underlying both AI & Law and
AI in general to illustrate and differentiate the theory of knowledge underlying both. So far, we have looked at the first two decades of AI & Law by
way of two seminal works. These two decades are also the first two decades
of AI in general.
We will now turn our attention to work on AI & Law in the 80s and 90s.
The most significant feature of these decades and continuing till the 2010s
is a characterization of the period as an AI winter. AI winter, like all hype
cycles starts with pessimism in the research community, amplified several
times over by pessimism in general media culminating in a funding freeze
by investors – private & public.
In the backdrop of the severe funding freeze for research and development of AI in general, we see the establishment of the first International
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law (ICAIL) in May 1987 at
Boston, Massachusetts11. The first ICAIL is widely regarded as the birth of
an AI & Law research community with a truly international forum to present their research findings at the intersection of AI and law.
The first ICAIL marks not only the establishment of a robust AI &
Law research community, but also a move towards a connectionist logical
model away the underlying abstractionist models of Dr. Mehl and L. Thorne
McCarty. The argument for connectionist approaches was the failure of
various symbolic systems to model abstract legal concepts. Connectionist
approaches were proposed as a resilient architecture to wrangle the
9
10

11

McCarty, (n 6), p. 27
Brenden M. Lake, Ruslan Salakhutdinov and Joshua B. Tenenbaum, “Human-Level
Concept Learning Through Probabilistic Program Induction” (2015) SCIENCE: 1332–1338.
Bart Verheij, Enrico Francesconi, Anne Gardner, “ICAIL 2013: The Fourteenth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law” (2014) <https://www.aaai.org/
ojs/index.php/aimagazine/article/view/2523/2429> [accessed 12 September 2019].
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incomplete and inconsistent set of rules and descriptions that characterize
Law. Connectionist models draw from computational neuroscience and are
restricted to the study of individual human brains, in the author’s opinion.
Concepts like mirror neurons that are attributed to associative12, inter-personal or social learning has not been incorporated into the theory of computing epistemology yet.
Connectionist models represent a divergence from defeasible reasoning or
adversarial inference model in legal thought. Adversarial inference is a form
of inter-personal or social learning. Its manifestation, in legal theory and
practice is characterized by progressive learning of the Truth or Knowledge
through an interaction of a minimum of three parties - the judge, the prosecution and the defense.
Artificial Neural Networks alternately labelled Deep Learning are computer embodiments of the connectionist approach that knowledge ‘emerges’13
from the various connections of neurons similar to the human brain. We
will return to Deep Learning and how a divergence away from legal theory
of adversarial learning leads to an inadequate modeling of the legal system
in Section 2. For the rest of this section, we will take a quick look at a few
notable AIs in Online Dispute Resolutions with a discourse on their underlying systematic logic.
Softlaw by Peter Johnson and David Mead14 is an online legal expert system released in the early 90s to serve legislation to public consumers. The
objective was to simplify the internal logical complexity of legislative provisions for non-lawyer consumers. The motivation to achieve this is misinterpretation of legislative legal text - treating a disjunction as a conjunction,
misinterpreting the order of evaluation of logical expressions or failing to
recognize a double negative - can have dire consequences15. Softlaw aimed
to address these dire consequences through a rigorous, 4-stage, systematic model. In Step 1, Softlaw created a verbatim model of legislation that
includes all and only subject legislation. In Step 2, Softlaw took the path
of creating overview of effect of legislation and avoiding all shortcuts in
12

13

14

15

Kosonogov, V., “Why the Mirror Neurons Cannot Support Action Understanding” (2012),
Neurophysiology, 44 (6): 499–502.
The author has emphasized Emerges to draw attention to emergent behaviour that is a rigorous mathematical model of the saying “The whole is greater than the sum of the parts”.
Peter Johnson, David Mead, “Legislative Knowledge Base Systems for Public
Administration: Some Practical Issues,” (1991) ICAIL 91, 108–11.
Layman Allen, Charles Saxon, “Some Problems in Designing Expert Systems to Aid Legal
Reasoning” (1987) ICAIL, 94.
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modeling logic. In Step 3, the authors acknowledge that the bulk of difficulty in interpreting legislation is due to the complexity of its structure.
Hence, they created a systematic logical model for the explicit modeling of
structure to complement the verbatim modeling of subject of legislation in
Step 1. Step 4 allowed a separation of rule types to separate the structure of
legislation from the meaning of certain words and from the function of judicial pronouncements on the interpretation of those words.
Softlaw was acquired by Oracle Corporation and forms the basis for
Oracle Policy Management. In the view of Adam Z. Wyner, Associate
Professor in Law and Computer Science at Swansea University; the AI &
Law community has not followed suit with similar open-sourced tools for
research and development despite the commercial success of Softlaw/Oracle
Policy Management.
In 1997, R.P. Loui presented the Room 5 system at ICAIL. Room 5 was
an online legal expert system to allow users to argue legal cases. Their
goal was to facilitate discussion of pending US Supreme Court cases by
the broader, non-legal trained citizenry16. It is the opinion of the author that
R.P. Loui’s work on community participation is either parallel to, or a precursor to Cass Sunstein’s works on prediction markets17 and wisdom of the
crowds18. Room 5 had an underlying systematic logic based on nested tables
rather than the more common decision tree structures. Room 5 was used
to demonstrate an online resolution of a simple stolen goods dispute in the
case of a juvenile offender with pros and cons arguments for the approach.
It is the opinion of Bart Verheij, President of the International Association of
Artificial Intelligence and Law (IAAIL) and Chair of Artificial Intelligence
and Argumentation at the University of Groningen that Room 5’s nested
arguments is a superior representation as it does not readily allow for the
graphical representation of what Pollock famously refers to as the undercutting argument.19

16

17

18

19

R.P. Loui, J. Norman, J. Altepeter, D. Pinkard, D. Craven, J. Lindsay, M. Foltz, “A Testbed
for Public Interactive Semi-Formal Legal Argumentation”, (1997) ICAIL, 207–214.
Cass R. Sunstein, “Deliberating Groups Versus Prediction Markets (Or Hayek’s Challenge
to Habermas) Episteme, Forthcoming” University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin
Working Paper No. 321; University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 146
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=956189>.
Disclosure: The author has a granted US Patent US9033781B2 Robert Craig Steir, Michael
Scott Brewster, Avinash Viswanath Ambale, “Designing A Real Sports Companion MatchPlay Crowdsourcing Electronic Game”.
Douglas Watson, Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law (2010),
Springer-Verlag.
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We now introduce the concept of defeasible logic or adversarial inference in the theory of knowledge. John Pollock, the father of defeasible
logic or “Mr. Defeasible Logic” did not have much interest in the theories
of legal reasoning though his formal, systematized logic and correspondent
mathematical representations have a wide impact in the field of Artificial
Intelligence and Law. This marks a clear line-in-the-sand to establish a
timeline for AI & Law. Both in terms of chronological timeline and systematic logic timelines; what we have looked at is historical, yesterday’s AI. In
the next section, we will look at Today’s AI & Law.
V. SECTION 2: DEFEASIBLE LOGIC OR
ADVERSARIAL INFERENCE

In the previous section, we looked at the history of systematic logic
underlying both AI and law by way of illustrative examples of the computer
manifestations of those logical constructs. We introduced the concept of
defeasible logic or adversarial inference at the end of the last section and a
clear, epochal shift in the timeline of Artificial Intelligence and Law that we
characterized as Yesterday’s AI.
Yesterday’s AI did not unlearn when presented with conflicting information i.e., they do not use adversarial inference to progressively (socially)
learn. Using yesterday’s AI for Law with an “individual-brain” connectionist
model is like a one-sided justice system without inter-connected or social,
adversarial learning. Yesterday’s AI only computes forward probability.
Given a hypothesis, it will match evidentiary patterns across huge volumes
of data.
Deep Learning, in most of its incarnations constitutes Yesterday’s AI. In
statistical terms, conventional Deep Learning networks demonstrate prosecutor’s fallacy. Imagine this scenario in a courtroom. The prosecutor has
previously introduced uncontested evidence to the court. Prosecutor questions an expert witness, “given the evidence, what is the probability that the
defendant is innocent?” The expert witness says, “the odds of finding this
evidence on an innocent man are so small that the court can safely disregard
the possibility that the defendant is innocent”20
We owe to Thomas Bayes, a statistician and Presbyterian minister who
answered theological questions with statistical rigour – the Bayes theorem
20

Fenton, Norman; Neil, Martin; Berger, Daniel, “Bayes and the Law” (June 2016), Annual
Review of Statistics and Its Application, 3: 51–77.
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that calculates the probability of a cause aka verdict (guilty or innocent)
from the evidence aka effect. It is fairly straight-forward to compute forward
probability, i.e., if we decide the cause (guilty), to compute probability of the
effect aka evidence. Computing inverse probability, i.e., cause from effect
(verdict from evidence) is not only not intuitive, but also tricky.
Using Bayes theorem, the defense counters, “if it might please the court,
the prosecution obscures the fact that the probability of the defendant’s
innocence is significantly different than presented. His innocence depends
not just on the probability of said evidence; but on the likely higher prior
probability of his innocence, the explicitly lesser probability of evidence in
the case he was innocent as well as the cumulative probability of the evidence being on the defendant”.
A symbolic representation of the same in mathematical construct is below

P (H/E), {i.e., Probability of Hypothesis (Innocence or Guilt) Given
(the/operator signifies given) Evidence} = P(H) {i.e., Prior Probability of
Hypothesis} Multiplied by P(E/H) {i.e., conditional probability of Evidence
given Hypothesis} Divided by P(E) {i.e., Probability of Evidence}
Restating the defense’s assertion in mathematical terms,

The legal fraternity might benefit from looking at Meadow’s Law and
its egregious misuse of the prosecutor’s fallacy in securing wrongful death
claims against mothers for infant deaths.21
It is the author’s opinion that this measure of uncertainty or conditional
probability is missing from current neural network (Deep Learning) architectures. Bayesian networks provide a more robust and resilient architecture
to represent Law because it incorporates inter-personal or social Learning
and not just the “individual-brain” connectionist model of Deep Learning.

21

Wikipedia contributors, “Meadow’s Law”, (Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia 30 July
2019, 17:02 UTC), <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Meadow%27s_law&oldid=
908583734> [accessed 13 September 2019].
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The doctrine of adversarial inference in common law seems tailor-made
for the application of Bayesian networks. There is sparse or no documentation on the influence Thomas Bayes and his work had on the origins of
the adversarial system in England. The author stipulates his prosecutor’s fallacy in finding a link, however tenuous and notes that Thomas Bayes passed
away in 1761, a year after Sir William Garrow, whose reforms helped usher
in the adversarial legal system was born in 1760.
We called Deep Learning in most of its incarnations as Yesterday’s AI
earlier in this section. Aided by celebrity scientists and super-successful
entrepreneurs, advances in Deep Learning are breathlessly shilled by media
as the end-point of evolution of homo sapiens in stories with headlines about
Robot Overlords and Singularity. The theory of learning of Yesterday’s AI
cannot accomplish what Courts in England could achieve two centuries ago;
that of unlearning when presented with conflicting information and computing a balance of probabilities, i.e., inter-personal or social Learning.
If we pair yesterday’s AI which matches evidentiary patterns to hypothesis with another AI that generates alternate hypotheses from evidence (data),
we have Today’s AI22. This competing dyad of Neural Networks is aptly
named Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), in a seeming nod to the
adversarial system in common law. The two AIs are competing to optimize
diametrically opposing functions in a zero-sum game; but, they are agnostic
to the outcome. The outcome is discovery of the Truth or in Sir William
Garrow’s dictum “Presumed Innocent till proven guilty”. We finally begin
to see the incorporation of inter-personal or Social Learning into Artificial
Intelligence in general; these are not Bayesian Deep Learning networks, yet.
In reality, GANs have largely been used from 2018 onwards in only a very
limited set of applications. One is accelerating drug discovery for diseases.
This seems to be the only application area with positive societal impact.
GANs have been garnering a lot of media attention primarily for questionable societal impact by the creation of Deep Fakes and forgery of fine art23.
While the underlying logical model seems to have converged; implementations of computational law using these models don’t seem to have
22

23

The term Today’s AI is deliberately mislabelled. It is not widely used yet (September 2019)
and is possibly Tomorrow’s AI. However, we mislabel this to show the epochal shift from
Today’s AI (that is really Tomorrow’s AI) using Adversarial Inference and Tomorrow’s AI
(that is really day-after-tomorrow’s AI) and uses causal inference models.
Karen Hao, “Inside the World of AI that Forges Beautiful Art and Terrifying Deepfakes”
<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612501/inside-the-world-of-ai-that-forges-beautifulart-and-terrifying-deepfakes/> [accessed 13 September 2019].
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converged. There is very scant to little published research on the application
of GANs to dispute resolution – adjudicative or ADR.
Conventional Neural Networks (Deep Learning) that gets giddying media
attention for surpassing human skills in image classification works by using
single point-estimates. These single point-estimates are used as weights to
classify images. Creating a Deep Learning mechanism that uses probability
distribution to truly mimic Bayesian adversarial learning is computationally
very expensive. We will not get into the trenches of the mathematics and
relative costs & benefits of GANs and Bayesian Neural Networks. Instead,
we will shift gears in Section 3 to look at causal inference models that
represent a quantum leap up from Bayesian networks. We will look at
recently published research that models causal inference from a real-life
case to firmly establish cause-in-fact. These mathematical models establish
cause-from-effect and interestingly, cause-from-multiple effects; a case of
over-determination.
In Sections 1 and 2, we have seen the systematic logic underpinning AI
& Law and how they diverged. Section 2 on Today’s AI shows the convergence of centuries old legal thought to the systematic logic of adversarial
inference (social) learning. In the next section, we will look at Tomorrow’s
AI that goes a step beyond balance of probabilities to firmly establish
causation. We will also look at game theory models for their application to
Online Dispute Resolution.
VI. SECTION 3: CAUSAL INFERENCE
MODELS & GAME THEORY

Tomorrow’s AI goes beyond balance of probabilities to establish causation. Theoretical work on causal inference was presented at the ICAIL
in June 201924. A causal inference AI used the landmark Heneghan v.
Manchester Dry Docks25 case to identify and evaluate cause-in-fact. This AI
focused on over-determination, i.e., which of the more than one causes leads
to one outcome. Asbestos exposure was among 8 other causes modelled to
evaluate effect on adenocarcinoma/lung cancer. The causal effect of ‘what’
caused the adenocarcinoma and ‘who’ among the multiple employers caused
it were determined through these causative models.

24

25

Ruta Liepina, Giovanni Sartor and Adam Wyner, “Evaluation of Causal Arguments in
Law: The Case of Overdetermination” (2019) ICAIL.
Heneghan v. Manchester Dry Docks Ltd., 2014 EWHC 4190.
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This research had two objectives and associated rationales. One, there is
a lot of debate at both semantic and metaphysical levels about the definition of causation 26. Hence, the objective was to create a systematic logical
model, represented in mathematical language for causation and associated
legal liability. This would counter the inadequacy of the traditional “but-for”
tests in cases of over-determination. Two, existing case precedent27 is a policy-based, ‘material contribution’ exception without a quantitative basis to
define ‘material contribution’. Hence the objective was to define, by effectto-cause mathematical models; a quantitative basis for material contribution
to the effect where multiple contributors have caused effect.
The research looked at three separate sub-fields of Artificial Intelligence,
one – Causal inference and computation of Causal Calculus for a NESS
test28 (Necessary Element of Sufficient Set of causes), two – Evidential reasoning to use causal stories and evidential arguments to analyse competing
positions as a hybrid theory29 and three – Argument schemes that analyse
common reasoning patterns in arguments with critical questions to evaluate
the strength of the arguments.30
VII. FACTS OF THE CASE

In 2011, Mr Heneghan started displaying symptoms of lung cancer. He
died in 2013 due to adenocarcinoma – a malignant lung tumour. His estate
claimed compensation for wrongful death caused by exposure to asbestos
against 6 of the 10 employers he was employed at between 1961 and 1974.
Mr Heneghan was a cigarette smoker, as well.
26

27

28
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30

Michael S. Moore, “Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and
Metaphysics” (2009) OUP.
The rationale for a quantitative basis for “material contribution” is a policy-based exception in the case of overdetermination in the landmark Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral
Services Ltd., (2003) 1 AC 32 : (2002) 3 WLR 89 : 2002 UKHL 22. Mr Fairchild had
worked for a number of employers who had negligently exposed him to asbestos, eventually leading to his death from malignant mesothelioma. It was impossible to point out
which of the employers exposed him to asbestos leading to his mesothelioma. The traditional test of causation, “on the balance of probabilities” was deemed inadequate to
establish causation to a single employer. The judgment of the House of Lords was “the
appropriate test of causation is whether the employers had materially increased the risk of
harm to the claimants” – a ruling enshrined as the Fairchild Exception.
Alexander Bochman, “Actual Causality in a Logical Setting” (2018) IJCAI, 1730–1736.
Floris J. Bex, Peter J. Van Koppen, Henry Prakken, and Bart Verheij, “A Hybrid Formal
Theory of Arguments, Stories and Criminal Evidence” (2010) Artificial Intelligence and
Law, 18(2): 123–152.
Douglas Walton, Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligence in Law (2005) Springer
Science+Business Media.
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Commentary: This case is justifiably complicated due to the multiplicity
of causes – cigarette smoking, multiple contributors of asbestos exposure,
long latency period between asbestos exposure and morbidity, various alternative causes and confounders. Does the court use the conventional, strict
burden-of-proof requirement or does it use the Fairchild exception? Does the
court rely on the testimony of expert witnesses who use the Helsinki criteria31 to compute estimates of each employer/defendant’s individual ‘material contribution’ as ranging from 2.5 to 10.5% - limits deemed to materially
increase the risk of contracting the disease?
The research based on causal inference and argumentation schemes created a quantitative calculus to algorithmize the complicated decision-making.
The causal inference model went one step beyond the judge who ignored
the smoking history of Mr Heneghan. It created two causal models: one for
asbestos exposure and another for smoking and added proportional values
to the combination of these causal models. It is unable to verify, with exactitude, which of the asbestos fibres caused the cell mutation leading to lung
cancer. Hence, evidentiary considerations were not argued due to the strict
‘burden-of-proof’ requirements. Instead, the claimants sought to use the
relaxed Fairchild exception; hence there was no evidentiary data to build up
the evidential model hybrid theory.
Using Causal Calculus from NESS theory along with mathematical set
theory, the researchers established mathematical formulae for the eventual decision. These formulations algorithmized the NESS test evaluation
whether an element in a set is a sufficient contributory cause from the set of
all causative elements.
In summary, this research has conclusively demonstrated the ability to
create a hyper-rational, mathematical model of decision-making, specifically
in tortious injury cases with many contributing causes and confounders.
Though tested in a lab setting, this AI demonstrates ability to build causal
models from limited data – an inability of Deep Learning that we looked
at in Section 2. These models can be applied to achieve uniform outcomes
with or without human heuristics. (we will look at heuristics in Section 4)
Causal Inference models, by incorporating social learning (and, in this case
31

Editors: Panu Oksa, Henrik Wolff, Tapio Vehmas, Paula Pallasaho and Heikki Frilander,
“Asbestos, Asbestosis, and Cancer: Helsinki Criteria for Diagnosis and Attribution 2014”
(2014) <www.julkari./bitstream/handle/10024/116909/Asbestos_web.pdf> [accessed 13
September 2019].
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social learning from more than 7 opposing parties, their respective counsel,
a jury and the judge and appeals court judges) move away from the rigid,
individual-brain connectionist models underlying Today’s AI, i.e., Deep
Learning.
In the section on the History of AI & Law, we looked at AI applied outside the adjudicative process in areas of law like tax law – trade and corporate, legislative law outreach, and citizen-law. We took a brief detour into
the adjudicative process and tort law earlier in this section to illustrate latest advances in computational research applied to law. With computational
research catching up to centuries-old legal thought; we have adversarial
inference and causal inference computation models. These models are necessarily zero-sum even if the outcome is serving the cause of justice. The
application of these computational models to ADR, specifically consumer
law needs further research. We will return to the hyper-rationality basis of
AI and how that conflicts with the conception of social justice through a
game theory concept. But, first a primer on game theory, specifically non
zero-sum games with an illustrative example of online dispute resolution in
consumer law.
To introduce game theory, let us look at economics – specifically the
economics of marketplaces where consumers and retailers electronically
trade goods; by definition e-commerce. Classical economics of Adam Smith
applied to a two-way e-commerce market-place is a zero-sum game – one
party has to lose for the other to win. In this formulation, unbridled competition in this marketplace delivers best results. Which means either retailers
see their margins progressively erode to zero; or consumers see a progressive inflation in prices of goods sold32. In Adam Smith’s conception, competitive behaviour drives market equilibrium. John Nash, through his famous
Nash Equilibrium shows competitive behavior is a non-optimal equilibrium.
The impact of John Nash on game theory cannot be overstated. In the context of his paper “The Bargaining Problem”, John Nash created a mathematical construct for maximizing utility for cooperative negotiators aka
non-zero-sum games. This mathematical construct is widely used in problems from economics to political science. ODR, being a subset of ADR with
its focus on win-win settlements outside the adjudicative process is well
suited for applications of non-zero-sum game theories.
32

Let us set aside the fact that e-commerce marketplaces are not completely neutral as they
skew the market either by providing their own captive supply or by artificial spikes in
demand through incentives.
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In micro-economics, utility maximization is defined as a problem consumers face: “how do we spend our money to maximize our utility?”. In
a marketplace where consumers are in a cooperative bargaining situation
with retailers; utility maximization is a two-person game of negotiation. In
Nash’s mathematical formulation of the bargaining solution; both players get
their status quo playoff (i.e., noncooperative playoff) in addition to a share
of benefits occurring from the cooperation.33
Nash had a set of mathematical axioms (that we will not go into in this
paper) as absolutes to be satisfied to maximize utility for both players. An
optimal equilibrium that satisfies those axioms are precisely the points
that maximize the expression

u and v are utility functions of Players 1 and 2 respectively. d is a disagreement outcome.
In this formulation u(d) and v(d) are status quo utilities that either player
enters into if they decide not to bargain with the other player.
This is a very elegant mathematical representation of the disagreement
outcome or dispute hence validating their application in ADR, specifically
mediation as applied to consumer law in marketplaces. However, Nash’s
bargaining problem seeks to maximize overall good without any regard to
equitable distribution of benefits. This is in direct contrast to John Rawls
“maximizing the minimum utility” outlined in his Theory of Justice. We
will see that conflict articulated in an eNegotiation system, Family Winner
further below in this section.
Following John Rawls’ and Howard Raiffa’s maximin principle34, a rigorous mathematical model for Negotiation of Multi-Objective Water Sources
Conflicts was created35. This forms the basis for a commercial implementation of an automated eNegotiation tool for ODR in consumer law, specifically e-commerce, SmartSettle. SmartSettle enhances Nash’s bargaining
problem by removing the need for each player in the two-person game to
know the other’s preferences. This work is patented and implemented as
33
34
35

Nash, John, “The Bargaining Problem” (1950), Econometrica, 18 (2): 155–162.
Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, (1982) Belknap Press of HUP.
Thiessen, E.M., and D.P. Loucks, “Computer-Assisted Negotiation of Multi-Objective
Water Resources Conflicts” (1992) Water Resources Bulletin, American Water Resources
Association 28(1), 163–177.
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the SmartSettle eNegotiation System36. SmartSettle released in the early 90s
lacks live applications per their 2016 press release.37
In the early 90s, another eNegotiation system, Family Winner was created at Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia. The objective was to
avoid trial law and the associated zero-sum games in settling Property
Claims in a Divorce Settlement. The researchers38 observe a fundamental
conflict in building eNegotiation systems like Family Winner – is the system
concerned with providing justice or supporting mediation?
Family Winner uses both game theory concepts and heuristics. We will
take a brief look at heuristics in Section 4. Family Winner automatically
computes trade-off rules from input information of importance values, i.e.,
the degree to which each party desires the undivided marital asset. The
basic assumptions in Family Winner are: one, dispute can be modeled using
Principled Negotiation; two, weights can be assigned to each of the issues
in dispute and three, sufficient issues are in contention for each party to
be compensated for losing an issue. The detailed mathematical formulation
behind this process is beyond the scope of this paper as that would require
dozens of pages of explanatory notes.
In real-world trials of Family Winner at the Victoria Legal Aid (VLA)
family solicitors’ practices; the overriding concern was the bias towards
mediation over justice. This follows the logical conflict between John Nash’s
formulation and John Rawls maximin conceptualization we noted earlier.
Further research is required to examine a possible combination of adversarial inference or causal inference that deliver established norms of jurisprudence with maximin non-zero-sum game theory that delivers mediated
negotiation settlements as a possible solution for ODR in Consumer Law
In all, despite the spectacular progress of systematic logic and their technology implementations, AI or algorithmic models for eNegotiation have not
scaled out of academia into real-life mediation chambers – online or offline.
From our description of a Turing test for law in the introduction; we can
see AIs successfully passing the test in this section. As we concluded this
36
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Ernest M. Thiessen, “Computer-Based Method and Apparatus for Interactive ComputerAssisted Negotiations’ (1996), US Patent 5,495,412 (ICANS).
<https://smartsettle.com/2016/03/16/ecommerce/>.
John Zeleznikow, Emilia Bellucci, “Family Winner: Integrating Game Theory and
Heuristics to Provide Negotiation Support” (2003) Legal Knowledge and Information
Systems : JURIX 2003: The Sixteenth Annual Conference, Bourcier, Danièle, ed., Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence and Applications. IOS Press, Amsterdam, 21–30.
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section, we came to the premise that despite tremendous logical and computational progress, AIs have not scaled out of academia. In the next section,
we will look at some possible reasons why. This following section will be
time to focus on the input/output slot below the pane of glass in our version
of the Turing Test and the wording of those questions.
VIII. SECTION 4: POSSIBLE REASONS WHY
AI HAS NOT SCALED INTO REAL-LIFE
COURTROOMS/MEDIATION CHAMBERS

Celsus in Justinian Digest 1 said “To Know the Law is not merely to
understand the words; but as well their force and effect”.39
AI stops at lexical analysis, i.e., analysis of word structure, their frequency of occurrence etc. It does not have a semantic understanding of
concepts for even everyday language. This sounds like the beginning of a
joke – “two professors get on the internet”. But, it was a real-life experiment
documented in a peer-reviewed research article about the pitfalls of AI with
layman language. Two leading researchers at the intersection of AI & Law40
perform a Google Search for “Artificial Intelligence” + “Online Dispute
Resolution”. The top search results point to either their research articles or
conference presentations; leading the researchers to conclude they are THE
experts in this field. They try this search with a different string. “Artificial
Intelligence” + “On Line Dispute Resolution”.
What a difference a single space between on and line makes. These
search results lead them to more scholars with published research. We are
talking now about a problem with both AI (Google) as well as with creators/
publishers of legal work – scholars and practitioners. If the creator/publisher
of the text had added metadata markups to indicate synonyms, Google’s
web crawlers could have indexed both and served appropriate search results.
And, Almighty Google – a veritable Leviathan of the information age does
not have a thesaurus to indicate on-line is the same as on line is the same
as online. If this is the state-of-art with Google’s much-vaunted AI prowess
with layman language; let us compound the problems a hyperbolic zillion
times over for the legal lexicon, semantics and ontology. Among various
39
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Justinian, Digest, Book 1, Title 3, 17 Quotations in the Langdell Reading Room <https://
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projects to create a standardized legal ontology, The Center of Electronic
Dispute Resolution in Netherlands stands out in its work– the BEST project41
to map legal language to everyday language. The BEST project along with
other ODR projects is now wound up due to financial unviability.
But, back to Google and the internet. Way before Google, were the standards – HTML and HTTP. HTML or Hyper-Text Markup Language provides
a consistent framework to display any kind of textual content on the internet. With ample support to add plug-ins in a modular fashion, it grew to
accommodate video, voice and other media on the internet. HTTP – Hyper
Text Transfer Protocol seamlessly transfers data across multiple varieties of
internet switches and routers to render them across a wide variety of computers, browsers and mobile apps in exactly the same form. Standardization
of the language of the internet, i.e., machine readable and machine executable language led to a proliferation of internet sites; so much so that finding relevant results became impossible. This necessitated search engines
and Google, with its superior indexing capabilities has become the de-facto
Leviathan of information organization and retrieval. The fly-wheel effect of
harmonized, standardized data provides a solid bedrock for the mathematical models of Google’s AI to function.
Equivalent markup languages and interchange protocols are lacking in
the legal world. Standardization of legal documentation has been attempted
and mandated by legislation across different countries. Machine readable
and machine executable legal code has been in place for a few decades;
but competing standards, lack of enforcement and different stakeholders
makes its universal adoption a Holy Grail. For instance, in the EU – there
is MetaLex and LKIF. Other than legal scholars and possibly computer engineers; the differences are hard to fathom for legal practitioners or laypeople.
MetaLex aims to serve as the lowest common denominator for a common
standard for the interchange of data. Confusingly, LKIF – Legal Knowledge
Interchange Format calls attention to interchange by its very name but is
meant for Interpretation of the Law or Knowledge Representation.
In the US, President Obama mandated all public government documentation to be released in machine readable form; though no specific format was
mandated or followed. The Hammurabi project seeks to create a repository
41
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of computable law in the US to enable a law machine to take facts as inputs
and return decisions. It started codifying parts of tax and immigration law
in the US with a long way more to go. We are back at the beginning of AI
& Law in 1958 with Dr. Mehl’s law machine and codifying the law. Halfa-century later, progress on codifying the law has not advanced as significantly as progress in the mathematical models to represent legal thought.
If we recall Max Weber’s maxim from Section 1, “rationalize, then mechanize” – we are still in the stages of codifying the law for it to be machine
readable and to be processed by the hyper-rational mathematical models of
AI.
So, back to Celsus in Justinian. AI has not understood the words yet; so,
it does not know the law. The Law has not presented its words harmoniously
and consistently to AI. This mutually assured regression is possibly the
single biggest reason why AI & Law has not seen the expected Cambrian
explosion.42
As to words’ force and effect; we will just mention them in this paper
as that is worthy of another paper in and of itself. The effect law seeks is
justice and equity by way of maximin as John Rawls called it. AIs being
rational agents are the opposite; they maximize utility and cannot consider
equitable distribution of benefits. As to the laws’ force, that we literally
interpret as enforcement; AIs bias in recidivism cases directly correlates to
AI creators’ socio-economic demography.43
Let us set aside AI’s lack of understanding of words, their force & effect
and look at a problem with human decision making – that of bounded
rationality44. Legal reasoning assumes all participants in conflict are
“rational agents”. As Cass Sunstein demonstrates through his research45
at the intersection of behavioural economics and the law; human decision
42
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making is not perfectly rational at all times. Human decision-making
resolves disputes via several heuristics; heuristics that cannot be represented
in Today or Tomorrow’s AI (as we labelled it). This is another major topic
we will not cover in this paper. Another major reason for lack of commercial implementations of AI & Law is the inability of AI to explain how it
arrives at its results. We will not detail the black-box nature of AI nor latest
advances in explainable AI in this paper.
IX. SECTION 5 – WAY FORWARD

It is imperative that we create codification or standardization or
machine-readable and executable standards and frameworks like LKIF,
MetaLex, Hammurabi for consumer law in India. Not only do we have the
problem described by Dr. Mehl with widely different legal documentation
requirements, we also have myriad natural languages. The codification
working committee should ideally be constituted with a mix of experts from
academia, legal practice, judiciary, legislation and data engineers/scientists.
For existing ODR initiatives, it might be advisable to start looking at
NLP (Natural Language Processing), a form of AI to automate the processing of free text entries claimants enter via emails or social media or notes
in structured web-forms. AI can help build a three-tiered taxonomy of
Category, Type & Item – this would help automate the workflow of routing
the right problem to the right participant and is an essential first step before
an automated eNegotiation or human-assisted eNegotiation. Extracting subject lines from unstructured text automatically could be another use of AI in
ODR.
The next step after AI for text inputs would be AI for voice inputs. The
same uses as above; but from human voice conversations – encompassing
ODR or Online to mean voice interfaces and not just text interfaces. That
way the lawyer in our Turing Test can hear and talk. These are baby steps
in the usage of AI for Consumer Law ODR; but the steps need to be supported by a solid bedrock of codified consumer law.

